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This dissertation looks to assess on the enforcement of minimum wages laws in Kenya. 
It does this by investigating on the exact extent of the enforcement of these laws and 
thereafter looking to evaluate on the factors causing such an extent of enforcement. 
Additionally, the dissertation looks to analyse and suggest the various approaches that 
could be considered so as to improve said enforcement.  
This dissertation does not look to question the viability of minimum wage legislation by 
itself as a policy instrument, but instead confines itself to assessing the enforcement of 
these laws; an area of research it identifies as generally ignored and minimally explored 
by the academic community.  
To achieve this, the dissertation primarily relies on secondary data from numerous strands 
of literature that have looked to analyse, whether partly or wholly, the questions that the 
dissertation seeks answers to. Thereafter, the dissertation combines and conceptualizes 
said data to paint a picture of the enforcement of these laws in contemporary Kenya as 
well as offer avenues through which the rate of enforcement can be improved.  
The dissertation indeed establishes that enforcement of these laws is dismal in Kenya, 
with the most relevant and latest source placing said non-enforcement at an astounding 
42% of all of Kenya’s labourers.  Some of the reasons behind this poor extent of 
enforcement are identified by the dissertation as a poorly capacitated labour inspectorate 
as well as on the manner in which the minimum wages are set, including the 
considerations looked at in the process of such setting. The high informality rate that 
characterises Kenya’s labour force, and a general lack of awareness of these laws on the 
part of the various labour market players are too identified as major causes behind the 
poor rate of enforcement.  
The dissertation thereafter identifies ways in which such enforcement can be improved, 
and such measure as the sustainable formalization of the informal economy, the 
enhancement of the labour inspectorate as well as the spreading of information and 
awareness about these laws are identified to that effect. In the end, the dissertation 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The question as to whether to treat labour as a mere commodity as opposed to treating 
it as a non-commodity, an extension of a labourer’s dignity, has been asked for a long 
time now.1 Treating it as a commodity would dictate its value be governed by the 
economic forces of demand and supply just as any other generic market good is.2 
However, treating it as a non-commodity would necessitate government intervention 
to protect labourers’ rights due to the fact that the work of a labourer ties to his human 
dignity and is an expression of himself or herself.3 
Currently, and in theory, Kenya’s labour laws seem to be leaning towards the non-
commodification school of thought, with an array of laws stepping in to ensure that 
the labourer is protected in one way or another. The Labour Institutions Act provides 
for wages councils responsible for minimum wage setting across the country.4 This 
dissertation looks at the practical aspect of the enforcement of minimum wage 
legislation in Kenya.  
 It is evident that enforcement has been poor in Kenya even after there being laws that 
are in place to protect employees. For example, preceding research places the 
percentage of labourers paid below minimum wage at 42%.5 An astounding degree 
of ignorance of these laws by both employees and employers all over the country has 
also been a factor inhibiting the enforcement.6  
In Kenya, the legal framework governing minimum wage and the setting of 
conditions of employment emanates from part 6 of the Labour Institution Act.7 
Section 43 provides for the establishment of the General Wages Council (GWC) and 
                                                     
1 Pocock B, Prosser R and Bridge K, ‘The return of ‘labour-as-commodity’? The experience of casual 
work in Australia’ (2005), 459. 
2 Marx K, ‘Outlines of the critique of political economy’ in, The Collected Works of Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels: Volume 28, International Publishers, New York, 1986, 80. 
3 Preamble, Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (1919) 
4 Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
5 Danish Trade Union Council for International Development Cooperation (DTUCIDC), Kenya 
Labour Market Profile 2015, 2015, at 6. 
6 Manda D, Kosimbei G and Wanjala B, ‘Impact of minimum wages on formal employment in Kenya’ 
DP No. 67 Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, KIPPRA (2007), 5. 
7 (Act no. 12 of 2007) 
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the Agricultural Wages Council (AWC). It also provides that the Cabinet Secretary 
may establish a Sectoral Wages Council (SWC) in addition to the general wages 
council for any category of employees that he/she, with the consultation of the 
National Labour Board, feels is inadequately covered for by collective agreements 
and that it may be expedient to set minimum wages and other conditions of 
employment in such sectors.8 
The functions of wages councils include investigating the remuneration and 
conditions of employment in any sector and making recommendations to the minister 
following such investigation.9 Following the recommendations, the minister takes the 
responsibility of publicizing the wages orders in the gazette.10 Currently in Kenya, 
the latest general wages and agricultural wages regulations were passed on 1st May 
2015 through an announcement by the President.11 They represented a general 12% 
rise in wages from the previous orders. The enforcement of minimum wage laws in 
Kenya is done through the Labour Institutions Act and the inspection department of 
the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, herein after referred to as the 
Ministry.12 
The main purpose of minimum wage requirements is to empower workers whose 
wages are constrained by the excessive market power of the employer.13 Thus, 
enforcement is key in ensuring that this objective is realised. In fact, section 48 of the 
Labour Institutions Act provides that the rate of remuneration and conditions 
provided by a certain wages order are the utmost minimum an employer can offer an 
employee falling under such an order. An  employer who fails to comply with the 
provisions of a wages order commits an offence and the court, on finding the 
employer guilty, may impose penalties in addition to requiring the payment of the 
difference between the amount that ought to have been paid and that which was 
paid.14 Additionally, a labour officer may institute such proceedings on behalf of the 
                                                     
8 Section 43(2), Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
9 Section 44, Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
10 Section 46, Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
11 Legal notice no 116, no 117 of 2015,  Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
12 Section 35(1), Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
13 Andálon M and Pagés C, ‘Minimum wages in Kenya’ DP No. 3390 The Institute for the study of 
labor (2008), 2. 
14 Section 48, Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
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employee.15 The above is brief look at the legal framework governing minimum 
wages and their enforcement in Kenya.  
This dissertation hence seeks to establish, clearly, the reasons behind this poor rate of 
enforcement, if it is indeed so, and subsequently review possible ways through which 
the situation can be remedied. This dissertation will  look to answer this questions 
through its chapters that stream from its two research objectives. Chapter 2 will thus 
look to investigate on the extent or degree of minimum wage law enforcement in 
Kenya vis-a-vis the causes of such a degree of enforcement if it is indeed established 
to be poor. Chapter 3 will follow up by looking at approaches that would aid in 
improving the enforcement of minimum wage laws in Kenya. Chapter 1 will comprise 
the Introductory Chapter, whereas the last chapter, Chapter 4, will look to conclude 
the dissertation with recommendations therein as well, reliant on the findings of the 
preceding chapters.  
 1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
As stated above, there indeed exist laws regulating the employment relationships and 
that ensure dignified working conditions are put in place for employees in Kenya. 
However, as accords a number of studies, the enforcement of these laws has been 
dismal in Kenya.16  
Therefore, this research looks to establish the extent of minimum wage laws’ 
enforcement in Kenya and subsequently the reasons behind their poor enforcement, 
if it will indeed be established as so, in addition to the avenues through which 
enforcement can be improved. 
 1.3 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
The non-enforcement of employment regulations has received minimal policy 
attention and has over time been overlooked in studies in Kenya.17 Therefore, this 
dissertation presents a good opportunity for this problem to be investigated.  
More importantly, it is evident that a lot is at stake if widespread enforcement of these 
conditions is not realised in Kenya. Constitutional rights of hundreds of thousands 
                                                     
15 Section 49, Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
16 Bhorat H and Stanwix B, ‘Minimum wage enforcement in the developing world’ PB 13/29 The 
Development Policy Research Unit (2013), 2; DTUCIDC, ‘Kenya Labour Market Profile 2015’ 
(2015), 6. 
17 Andálon M and Pagés C, ‘Minimum wages in Kenya’, 19. 
4 
 
comprising the workforce are presently being breached. The Constitution provides 
workers with the right to, inter alia, fair remuneration and reasonable working 
conditions.18 The urgency of this study is therefore called upon in this sense. 
 1.4 GENERAL AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
General Objective 
The general objective of this study is to examine on the level of compliance with 
minimum wage laws by employers in the country as well as scrutinize on the extent 
as to which these laws are enforced in practice, as they are provided for in the laws. 
Additionally, avenues through which the state of enforcement can be improved are 
looked at. 
 Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives of this study are to: 
a) Investigate on the extent of the enforcement of minimum wage laws in Kenya 
vis-a-vis the cause of such a degree of enforcement if it is indeed poor. 
b) Review and suggest appropriate approaches that would improve the enforcement 
of these laws in Kenya.  
 1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The  Dissertation’s research questions are as follows:  
a) What is the degree or extent of minimum wage legislation’s enforcement in 
Kenya vis-à-vis the cause of such a degree of enforcement if it is indeed poor? 
b) What are some of the approaches that can be considered to improve the 




                                                     
18 Article 41(2), Constitution of Kenya (2010) 
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 1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW  
This dissertation’s literature review, just as the chapters, is divided into 2 thematic 
areas addressing each of the 2 objectives of the dissertation. 
1.6.1 What is the degree or extent of minimum wage legislation’s 
enforcement in Kenya vis-à-vis the cause of such a degree of enforcement if 
it is indeed poor? 
1.6.1.1 The degree or extent of minimum wage legislation’s enforcement? 
As aforementioned in the Background, the enforcement of minimum wage legislation 
in Kenya is pitiable. This position is supported by a resounding majority of the studies 
that have explored the issue, the latest being the Danish Trade Union Council for 
International Development Cooperation’s (DTUCIDC) 2015 study that places the 
percentage of labourers paid below their respective minimum wages at 42%. 
Older Research by Andálon and Pagés on minimum wage enforcement in Kenya 
posits that minimum wage non-compliance affected 1 in 6 workers, under the GWC 
and 1 in 4 workers under the AWC.19 The research identified paid employees as all 
workers working for someone else in exchange of a wage or salary though it made 
use of 1998/99 Integrated labour force survey (ILFS) data, thus is rather fairly 
outdated 20 
Bhorat and Stanwix similarly place the enforcement of minimum wage legislation as 
poor in Kenya,21 asserting that the presence of laws governing minimum wage 
standards in the developing countries, Kenya included, is not the problem as much as 
their enforcement is.22 Moreover, a 2004 study by Omolo and Omiti also brings out 
the extent of the inadequacy of enforcement, indicating that even the government 
itself does not adhere to the minimum wage regulations it passes.23 
                                                     
19 Andálon M and Pagés C, ‘Minimum wages in Kenya’, 4. (The councils were then referred to as 
Boards; the General Wages Board and the Agricultural Wages Board) 
20 Both wages boards indicated were established under the Regulations of Wages and Conditions of 
Employment Act (CAP 229) which is now repealed. The form of the wages boards under the new 
laws has however not changed under section 43 of the Labour Institutions Act. 
21 Bhorat H and Stanwix B, ‘Minimum wage enforcement in the developing world’, 4. 
22 Bhorat H and Stanwix B, ‘Minimum wage enforcement in the developing world’, 2. 
23 Omolo J and Omiti J, ‘Is minimum wage policy effective in Kenya?’ DP No. 054/2004 Institute of 
Policy Analysis and Research (2004), 16. 
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A study by the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) 
similarly points to poor enforcement of statutory minimum wage, attributing it to 
various reasons as will be observed in the ensuing part.24 The study observes that 
enforcement is comparatively better in the formal sector as opposed to the informal 
sector though this does not seem to help the situation as the formal sector comprises 
of only around 22% of the Kenyan workforce.25  A study by the Kenyan Union of 
Domestic Hotels, Educational Institutions, Hospitals and Allied Workers 
(KUDHEIHA) Trade Union also points to the poor enforcement of labour regulations 
in Kenya, minimum wage laws included.26 
These studies accordingly reflect a compounded sorry state of the enforcement of 
minimum wage legislation in Kenya. This dissertation looks to dwell deeper into 
getting to establish the extent of the enforcement of minimum wage legislation in 
Kenya in its Chapter 2. In the chapter, the dissertation will look to wholly and 
comprehensively answer this question by contextualizing what the above works have 
presented as well as reling on other additional works. Quantitative data sourced from 
various works such as those mentioned above will be reilied on so as to give a stronger 
and exact picture of state of enforcement. In Chapter 2 also, statistics regarding the 
Kenyan labour market will also be presented so as to bring context to the state of 
minimum wage enforcement in Kenya.  
 The other question that therefore begs at this interval, and that is covered hereon 
under, is the reason or cause(s) of the poor degree of enforcement of these laws as 
has been seen from  the aforementioned studies. 
1.6.1.2 The Causes of the poor degree of enforcement? 
As has been established in the preceding subsection, a majority of the studies 
commissioned to establish the extent of the enforcement of minimum wage legislation 
in Kenya do not paint a good picture. Some of the causes and reasons for this poor 
state of enforcement are brought out in various works as is seen below.  
                                                     
24 Manda D, Kosimbei G and Wanjala B, ‘Impact of minimum wages on formal employment in 
Kenya’, 5. 
25 Manda D, Kosimbei G and Wanjala B, ‘Impact of minimum wages on formal employment in 
Kenya’, 5. 
26 KUDHEIHA Workers, A rapid assessment of domestic workers in Kenya, May 2011, at 17. 
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The study by Andálon and Pagés, even though not elaborate and comprehensive as to 
the root cause, attributes the poor enforcement to certain factors. Firstly, it attributes 
the poor rate of enforcement to the multiples categories of minimum wages in Kenya 
which, they argue, make it difficult for workers and firms to know them.27 Bhorat and 
Stanwix also backs this assertion, as regards Kenya.28 Further, Andálon and Pagés 
bring out the fact that minimum wages in Kenya are set at levels that are high in 
relation to the existent median wage of labourers in the minimum wage level, 
especially for semi-skilled and more skilled occupations falling under the wages 
orders.29 This, in turn makes minimum wage compliance a costly affair for the 
employers in the country.  
It is, however, important to note that Andálon and Pagés research was based on 
1998/99 data as was earlier mentioned, and that later, the legal framework would 
stipulate considerations that the wages councils should take into account in setting 
the minimum wage rates and conditions for employment, an aspect that the now 
repealed Regulations of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act, Chapter 299 of 
the Laws of Kenya did not incorporate. The conditions the councils should consider 
in the setting of minimum wage rates include the ability of employers to carry on their 
business successfully and economic factors such as, the requirements of economic 
development, the level of productivity and the desirability of attaining and maintain 
a high level of employment in Kenya.30 With that said, it is clear that the current 
framework is keen to look at the economic balance and, therefore, minimum wages 
set should not fall way above the median wage, as they did previously according to 
Andálon and Pagés.  
Furthermore, various studies have revealed that the Labour Inspectorate under the 
purview of the Ministry is understaffed, under resourced and generally untrained. The 
KUDHEIHA study indeed proclaims that Kenya’s labour inspectorate service is weak 
and overburdened.31 In the same way, the KIPPRA study acknowledges a lack of 
capacity on the government to enforce minimum wage laws in addition to a lack of 
cooperation from employers and a general lack of awareness on the part of the 
                                                     
27 Andálon M and Pagés C, ‘Minimum wages in Kenya’, 18. 
28 Bhorat H and Stanwix B, ‘Minimum wage enforcement in the developing world’, 2. 
29 Andálon M and Pagés C, ‘Minimum wages in Kenya’, 18. 
30 Section 44(5), Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
31 KUDHEIHA Workers, A rapid assessment of domestic workers in Kenya, Executive Summary. 
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workers as factors inhibiting enforcement and compliance with minimum wage 
laws.32 As such, this dissertation will come in by looking to bring out, in a 
comprehensive and conceptualized way, the attitudes and variables that cause a poor 
degree of enforcement in Kenya if it will indeed be confirmed as so in the preceding 
section of Chapter 2.  
 
1.6.2 What are some of the approaches that can be considered to improve 
the enforcement of Minimum wage legislation in Kenya? 
In an attempt to analyse approaches that would improve the enforcement of minimum 
wage legislation, Bhorat and Stanwix offer certain avenues. They propose that the 
law should play the role of a deterrent to potential offenders through the setting of 
higher penalties for non-compliance and better inspection of such compliance.33 The 
higher costs, in penalties, the employer may face from non-compliance may push 
such an employer to prefer adhering to minimum wage legislation. The risk of this 
however becomes that such a punitive approach risks driving firms into the informal 
sector and has general disemployment effects.34 This dissertation will look to dwell 
deeper into such mechanisms by seeing how best a balance can be established to avoid 
such dire consequences while still being effective.  
A study by Benassi on the implementation of minimum wage and creative solutions 
on the same provides for certain workable remedies that can be applicable in Kenya. 
These solutions are broadly divided into 5 categories which are, persuasion strategies; 
capacity building measures; establishment of monitoring systems that allow the 
detection of non-compliance; empowerment of labourers to enforce their wage rights, 
not only individually but through collective action; and sanctions structured in a way 
that they constitute an actual deterrent to non-compliance as is similarly advocated 
for by Bhorat and Stanwix.35 
The first mentioned solution, persuasion strategies, involves the building up of public 
support for minimum wage laws and civic education encouraging compliance and the 
                                                     
32 Manda D, Kosimbei G and Wanjala B, ‘Impact of minimum wages on formal employment in 
Kenya’, 5. 
33 Bhorat H and Stanwix B, ‘Minimum wage enforcement in the developing world’, 3. 
34 Bhorat H and Stanwix B, ‘Minimum wage enforcement in the developing world’, 4. 
35 Benassi C, ‘The implementation of minimum wage: Challenges and creative solutions’ Working 
Paper No. 12 Global Labour University (2011), Executive Summary.  
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importance of such compliance. The second, capacity building measures, involves 
training and enhancing the awareness of employers and labourers on minimum wage 
laws and how to go about implementing them. The study indeed encourages the 
participation and cooperation of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation of 
such techniques, thereby discouraging a government-only approach especially in 
techniques such as those of empowerment of the labourers and collective struggle as 
well as of civic education of the public that other non-state actors such as Unions and 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) could similarly facilitate.36 
The aforementioned KUDHEIHA study in a similar vein also advocates for civic 
education to the public by creating awareness on the part of workers and lobbying 
employers to support the implementation of minimum wage laws for the role it plays 
in national progression.37 The KUDHEIHA study, seeing that it is specifically 
concerned with domestic workers, also pushes for the establishment of a specialized 
SWC for domestic workers as well as the formalization of the sector, which is 
currently considered informal, so as to better attract the significance and the 
formalisation that is requisite to ensure the better protection of the workers in the 
sector by the government.38 
Indeed, the KUDHEIHA report paves way for a reflection as regards the possibility 
of the formalization of more sectors in the country currently considered informal as a 
means to better improve the protection of rights of workers therein by the government, 
including the right to be paid in accordance with the respective minimum wages. It is 
important to note that the KUDHEIHA study also encourages multi-stakeholder 
participation and cooperation in a bid to better implement minimum wage laws as 
does Benassi.39 
The above works certainly shed light on the status of minimum wage enforcement in 
Kenya as well as on the main issues affecting the same together with some of the 
avenues that can be considered in a bid to improve the state of affairs. This 
dissertation thus seeks to build on the same by looking to get an even clearly picture 
on the degree and status of enforcement and thereafter dwelling on acquiring a deeper 
                                                     
36 Benassi C, ‘The implementation of minimum wage: Challenges and creative solutions’, 7. 
37 KUDHEIHA Workers, A rapid assessment of domestic workers in Kenya, Executive Summary. 
38 KUDHEIHA Workers, A rapid assessment of domestic workers in Kenya, Executive Summary. 
39 KUDHEIHA Workers, A rapid assessment of domestic workers in Kenya, Executive Summary. 
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understanding on the cause of poor enforcement, if it indeed so. Subsequently, this 
dissertation looks to capture avenues in which the state of enforcement can be 
improved by suggesting novel and synthesized solutions as well as conceptualising 
them in a way that makes them practical for contemporary Kenya.  
 
 1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Conflict Theory 
Conflict theory is a theory propounded and advanced by various proponents including 
Karl Marx, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Max Weber, Randall Collins and Lewis 
Coser amongst others.40 Though the different proponents have over time branched to 
different directions in advancing this theory, its basic form remains intact and it is it 
that this study relies on.  
 
Conflict theory provides that conflict is normal and in fact characteristic of any and 
every society.41 Such conflict is not only tied to violent contention but is in fact mostly 
in the form of misunderstanding and antagonism that persons and social groups in a 
given society experience in their daily lives and relationships.42 Proponents such as 
Coser see conflict as instinctual for human beings and in fact perceive conflict as a 
vital means by which humans interact and look to tackle issues affecting them.43 What 
becomes of importance is how societies choose to partake in conflict; some descend 
into violence whereas others formulate norms or laws to govern them.44 Indeed, the 
former at times precipitates the latter. Proponents stress that human conflict is goal 
oriented and as such, human engage in conflict for a certain goal but mainly relating 
to the distribution of scarce resources.45 
 
Proponents of this theory such as Marx, are of the position that societies inevitably 
organise themselves into certain distinctive groups that have antagonistic 
                                                     
40 Randall C, Conflict sociology, Academic Press, New York, 1974, 56-61. 
41 Randall C, Conflict sociology, 56-61. 
42 Kenneth A, The social lens: An invitation to social and sociological theory, Pine Forge Press, 2007, 
215. 
43 Kenneth A, The social lens: An invitation to social and sociological Theory, 218. 
44 Coser L, ‘Social conflict and the theory of social change’ The British Journal of Sociology (1957), 
198.  
45 Kenneth A, The social lens: An invitation to social and sociological theory, 213. 
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relationships within each other.46 Since such societies are generally engaged in 
internal conflicts and struggles over power, ideas, and morals, such struggles bring 
about laws, or a struggle thereof to have laws or norms dictating how such a society 
can best accommodate the antagonistic social groupings with their antagonistic 
interests.47  
 
How does this theory relate to this study? Well, firstly, this theory brings to context 
the purpose of the institution of minimum wage laws in Kenya, as is globally, which 
is to protect workers from pay that does not befit a sustainable standards of living.48 
The underpinning of minimum wage law is to protect workers from employers of 
whom they are in an antagonistic relationship with since the latter group is primarily 
inclined to and interested in maximizing or maintaining their profits. Similarly, and 
more significant to the study, this theory elucidates on a primary reason as to why 
minimum wage enforcement and compliance is likely poor in Kenya, and that is 
because employers are in an antagonistic relationship with workers where they are 
primarily inclined to maximize or maintain profits and are thus unwilling or in fact 
unable to comply with minimum wage legislation. Coser illustrates on how antagonist 
groups in society look to advance themselves amidst their differing interests as 
follows: 
“....As has been pointed out, there is never complete concordance between what individuals 
and groups within a system consider their just due and the system of allocation. Conflict 
ensues in the effort of various frustrated groups and individuals to increase their share of 
gratification. Their demands will encounter the resistance of those who previously had 
established a 'vested interest' in a given form of distribution of honour, wealth and 
power...”49 
As such, this theory does well in bringing out the forces that almost likely affect the 




                                                     
46 Karl Marx, A contribution to the critique of political economy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, 
2. 
47Kenneth A, The social lens: An invitation to social and sociological theory, 218. 
48 ILO, Minimum wages: Wage fixing machinery, application and supervision, Report III (Part 4B), 
79th Session 1992, at 10. 
49 Coser L, ‘Social conflict and the theory of social change’, 203. 
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Public Choice Theory  
Another theory that guides this dissertation is the Public Choice theory. In its basic 
form, this theory seeks to elucidate on factors, primarily economic, that guide the 
decision making of politicians or policymakers in a given society.50 A derivative of 
Public Choice theory however dwells into looking into the factors that affect the 
decision making of normal citizens in their interaction with the various laws they 
encounter; this is the derivative mostly relevant to this dissertation. The proponents 
of this theory range from Knut Wicksell to James Buchanan and Kenneth Arrow.  
 
In its basic form the theory propounds that policy makers and politicians, in the course 
of their leadership and law-making mandate, do not wholly act in the interests of the 
common good but are in fact mostly motivated by their self-interests.51 This economic 
theory prescribes that politicians are only rational human beings when they look to 
protect their interests first when carrying out their entrusted mandate even if it results 
in the common good not being necessarily or wholly achieved.52 This theory is in 
respect to the policy makers’ mandate as concerns any duty regarding the distribution 
of wealth and scarce resources as entrusted by the electorate. As such, this theory 
offers a solution for this predicament facing the common good by providing that 
systems should be established to check such tendencies by politicians; and such 
systems should do this by putting at an economic disadvantage such defaulting 
politicians by fining them in a repugnant way that would deter them from such 
tendencies in the first place.53  
 
The derivative most relevant to this dissertation does not veer much from the basic 
form of the theory; which prescribes the use of economic rewards and punishments 
(fines) to regulate behaviour. This branch of Public Choice theory, applies to normal 
citizens’ interaction with the law, and proclaims that people are intrinsically 
motivated to maximize their personal gain in their behaviour toward the law.54 As 
such, proponents assert that, should a law making or law enforcement authority be 
                                                     
50 Buchanan J, ‘Public choice and public policy’ Centre of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute, 131. 
51 Blankart C and Koester G, ‘Political economy versus public choice’ KYKLOS International Review 
for Social Sciences. Volume 59 No. 2 (2006), 3. 
52 Blankart C and Koester G, ‘Political economy versus public choice’, 3. 
53 Tyler T, Why people obey the law, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1990, 3. 
54 Tyler, Why people obey the law, 21. 
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keen in ensuring compliance with a law that forces some sought of economic 
forfeiture on a citizen - a law such as tax remittance or paying employers above or as 
per minimum wage legislation, then the penalty for not observing such a law should 
cause graver economic detriment to such a citizen than compliance with the law in 
the first place would. This is so as to deter non-compliance with the law.55 
 
As per this theory, the keenness, consistency and legitimacy of such law enforcement 
authorities is also key as citizens will be similarly opportunistic and observant such 
that they may fail to comply with such laws requiring a sort of economic remittance 
if such an authority is lax and is less likely to detect their breach of law.56 
 
The relevance of this theory to this dissertation is that it sheds light on the factors that 
come into play in minimum wage law compliance and enforcement. These factors 
range from the keenness and consistency of the labour inspectorate in Kenya as 
established in the Labour Institutions Act in detecting violations of minimum wage 
law across the country. The theory points to the fact that enforcement agencies and 
institutions ought to be effective and proactive so as to secure citizens’ compliance 
with mandated behaviour.  
 
Similarly, this theory calls for an evaluation on the punishment that results as a 
consequence of a failure to comply with minimum wage law by employers and 
whether such penalties are economically deterrent enough to secure compliance. 
According to the Labour Institutions Act, the penalty resultant on an employer for a 
failure to comply with minimum wage legislation is reimbursement by the employer 
to the employee of the difference in wages that ought to have been paid to them as 
per the wages orders, and any other penalty that the court of law would render in 
addition.57 This theory would invoke the question of whether such a penalty is in fact 
grave enough to deter the employer from behaving in a manner contrary to law or is 
in fact lenient such that employers, on weighing the personal loss that may occasion, 
prefer not to comply with the said law. This question is more extensively looked at in 
the succeeding chapters of the dissertation.  
                                                     
55 Tyler, Why people obey the law, 21. 
56 Tyler, Why people obey the law, 29. 




Public Choice theory thus sheds light on some of the variables, such as institutional 
goodwill and citizen behaviour towards law, that are at play as concerns the 
enforcement of minimum wage legislation in Kenya.  
 
 1.8 HYPOTHESIS  
The hypothesis to be tested in this study is: 
There exists a contradictory relationship between employers and employees as 
regards minimum wage legislation; employers are inclined to non-compliance so as 
to minimize costs while employees would ultimately prefer to earn better wages.  
1.9 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation’s aim is to clearly establish the extent of enforcement of minimum 
wage laws in Kenya, the factors influencing the degree of their enforcement, and 
different approaches that can be applied to improve the extent of such enforcement 
based on their practicability in contemporary Kenya. The dissertation’s main aim is 
to conceptualize and synthesize different approaches that have previously looked to 
deal with this question and thereafter offer a fused and up-to-date outlook on the issue 
including the best way forward Kenya can adopt as concerns the same. 
As such, this dissertation will be primarily based on secondary sources and will 
involve data collection of both qualitative and quantitative nature as is outlined 
below:  
Qualitative data.  
Qualitative research and data will form the main method and source of information 
and material for this dissertation. This is mainly because qualitative data not only 
presents the reality of a situation in question, but also offers reasons, attitudes and 
motives  influencing such a situation. Qualitative research will be relied on 
extensively in all Chapters of the Dissertation.  
Quantitative data.  
This dissertation will also rely on the complementation of quantitative data. 
Quantitative data is crucial in that it will aid in presenting situations with exactitude 
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and in quantitifiable terms. The quantitative data the dissertation seeks to rely on will 
be sourced from secondary sources such as already commissioned reports.   
The methods that will be applied for the gathering of both the qualitative and 
quantitative data for the research are outlined below: 
i. Desk Research: Seeing as the dissertation is wholly reliant on secondary 
research, desk research will form the main research method of data gathering 
the dissertation will employ. The sources of data under this method will range 
from published books, reports, journal articles, government publications, 
dissertations, working and discussion papers, research papers, cases, 
newspapers and other authoritative internet resources.  
 
ii. Library Sources: This dissertation will also rely on library resources for 
information gathering. These will similarly range from books, journals, 
government statistics, dissertations, research papers, newspapers, research 
papers, cases, and other publications.  
An application of both quantitative and qualitative data is crucial as the former will 
help in bringing clarity to the research questions in precise and exact terms, so as to 
gauge the situations the research questions look to find answers to with exactitude. 
Qualitative data is similarly as crucial as, with the complementation of quantitative 
data, it offers clarity on the attitudes and explanations that inform such quantitative 
findings thereby bringing clarity to the issues that the research questions seek answers 
to.  
1.10 SCOPE, ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
1.10.1 Scope 
The dissertation focuses on analysing the enforcement of minimum wage legislation 
as opposed to questioning the viability or justification of minimum wage law itself. 
Thus, this dissertation starts off at a point of assumption that minimum wage laws are 
indeed legitimate policy instruments that therefore ought to be enforced. 
1.10.1 Assumptions 
More importantly, the word enforcement is taken to be synonymous with compliance 
in this dissertation’s context. This is because unravelling the two in the context of 
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minimum wage laws is problematic. Increased enforcement is likely to increase 
compliance, as firms are more likely to comply with the higher likelihood of being 
caught. This thus ends up painting a good picture as to the state of compliance. 
However, such increased efforts of enforcement may be as a result of the government 
reacting to a poor compliance rate in the first place. Thus there is a difficulty in 
unravelling the two for the purpose of analysis as Bhorat rightly observes.58 
In this dissertation therefore, both enforcement and compliance are applied and 
analysed as if they are comparable.  
1.11 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
i. Minimum Wage: Minimum wage may be understood to mean the minimum 
sum payable to a worker for work performed or services rendered, within a given 
period, whether calculated on the basis of time or output, which may not be 
reduced either by individual or collective agreement, which is guaranteed by law 
and which may be fixed in such a way as to cover the minimum needs of the 
worker and his or her family, in the light of national economic and social 
conditions.59 
ii. Enforcement: Enforcement, in this dissertation’s context, can be sufficiently 
defined as the act of compelling observance of or compliance with a law, rule, or 
obligation.60 
 
1.12 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN. 
The dissertation’s chapter breakdown streams from the Research Questions where 
each Research question will be answered by a Chapter of its own with the 
Introductory and Conclusion Chapters similarly included. The dissertation will 
thereby comprise four Chapters in total. They are broken down as follows: 
Chapter 1; Introduction 
The introductory chapter comprises a background to the problem and the study’s 
purpose. 
                                                     
58 Bhorat H, ‘Compliance with minimum wage laws in developing countries’ IZA World of Labor 
(2014), 6. 
59ILO, Minimum wages: Wage fixing machinery, application and supervision, Report III (Part 4B), 
79th Session 1992, 10. 
60 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/enforcement on 4 July 2016. 
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It includes the: 
a. Background: This section introduces the study, its theme, purpose and 
objectives. It also introduces the legal framework relating to minimum wage 
legislation enforcement in Kenya in a bid to launch the study’s aim which is 
to analyse the enforcement of minimum wage legislation.  
b. Statement of problem: This section clearly outlines the problem or subject 
this dissertation looks to answer to. 
c. Justification of the study: Under this section, the reason the carrying out of 
this research is called for is brought out.  
d. Statement of Objective(s): This section brings out the certain aims this 
dissertation seeks to accomplish.  
e. Research Questions: This section outlines the thematic areas in which the 
dissertation’s objectives are broken into and are to be answered.  
f. Literature Review: This section looks at the preceding works that have 
covered, whether wholly or partly, the areas this dissertation look to dwell in. 
This section analyses such preceding works as well as relate them to the 
questions this dissertation looks to answer in a bid to appreciate the previous 
works on the area and more importantly signify where this dissertation is to 
come in.  
g. Theoretical Framework: This subsection analyses certain theories that help 
in the understanding of the problems this dissertation looks to address. This 
section also helps in attempting to project the relationships and dynamics that 
affect and determine the degree of the enforcement of minimum wage 
legislation.  
h. Hypothesis: This section brings out the contradictory or conflicting variables 
that create the problem the dissertation looks to analyse and answer to. The 
problem being the enforcement of minimum wage.  
i. Research Design & Methodology: This section outlines the way in which 
the dissertation is to be carried out, including the methods of research and data 
gathering that are to be applied so as to answer to the research questions and 
objectives. 
j. Scope, Assumptions and Limitations of the Study: This section clarifies on 
the area the dissertation looks to dwell in and clarifies on areas it does not 
look to dwell into. It also includes the assumptions that the dissertation makes.  
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k. Definition of Terms: This section outlines the contextualized meaning of 
terms that will be recurring throughout the dissertion. 
l. Chapter Breakdown: This section outlines what each chapter of the 
dissertation entails. 
m. Time line/Duration: This section outlines the time and dates by which each 
chapter will take for its completion. 
 
Chapter 2: What is the degree or extent of minimum wage legislation’s 
enforcement in Kenya vis-à-vis the cause of such a degree of enforcement if it is 
indeed poor? 
This is the dissertation’s main chapter and it will seek to answer the two main 
questions it asks wholly and comprehensively. The first question being that of the 
extent and degree of enforcement while the second one will follow up on the first by 
looking at the attitudes that inform the situation that will have been presented by the 
first question. 
As such, this Chapter will begin with a comprehensive look at Kenya’s contemporary 
labour market profile especially as it relates to minimum wage laws. This section will 
mostly rely on quantitative data. Thereafter, the Chapter will look at the legal 
framework, both local and treaty laws, governing minimum wages and their 
enforcement, without looking to repeat that that is already covered in Chapter 1’s 
Background. Thereafter, the Chapter will be divided into two sections, each 
addressing the two main questions it seeks to answer.  
The first of the the said sections will mainly look to rely on quantitative data in 
determining the exact extent of these laws’ enforcement in Kenya. The Chapter will 
also rely on qualitative data relevant to the question the section poses to answer, in a 
bid to bring clarity to the same.  
The second of the sections will thereafter rely on the findings established in the first 
of the sections. It will mostly make use of qualitative data in a bid to gain an 
understanding on the issues and attitudes that cause whatever the first of the sections 
will have presented as the situation in terms of the degree of enforcement. 
Quantitative data will also be relied on to complement and better bring out some of 
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the reasons or motivations behind the situation that will have been established in the 
preceding section. 
 
Chapter 3: What are some of the approaches that can be considered so as to 
improve the enforcement of Minimum wage legislation in Kenya? 
This Chapter will look to offer avenues and the way forward as concern the 
improvement of the enforcement of minimum wage legislation. Indeed, this Chapter 
will similarly rely on the findings of the preceding Chapters, more so Chapter 2. 
Nonetheless, this Chapter will look to rely on both secondary qualitative and 
quantitative data on remedies and solutions that are best applicable in Kenya.  
The Chapter’s main aim will be to analyse an array of solutions as suggested in 
secondary sources, and examine their applicability in the Kenyan context. Such 
examination will be similarly guided by both quantitative and qualitative data as 
concerns Kenya’s labour market profile. The Chapter’s main aim will be to 
conceptualize different solutions as presented in different works and test their 
application in contemporary Kenya. 
 
Chapter 4: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 This final Chapter will thereafter conclude the dissertation with a summary of the 
final findings as well as offer conclusive recommendations. This Chapter will look to 
outline and conclusively summarise the main arguments of the preceding Chapters 
and thereafter offer recommendations from the study and as to the direction minimum 
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This chapter looks to answer on the extent of the enforcement of minimum wage 
legislation in Kenya and thereafter answer on the cause of the poor extent of 
enforcement if it will indeed be established as so. Therefore, so as to bring this 
questions to context, a section on some of the Kenyan labour market statistics relevant 
to minimum wage enforcement will commence the Chapter. Another section on the 
legal framework will follow so as to outline the legal framework, including treaty 
law, relevant to minimum wage law enforcement before the two main questions the 
chapter seeks answers to can be addressed in two separate sections.  
 
The Inclusion of the legal framework is so as to similarly bring the main questions to 
context before scrutinizing on the extent of the actual enforcement in practice and the 
causes of such a degree of enforcement. Both the labour market profile and the legal 
framework will be crucial in analysing some of the aspects influencing the questions 
this Chapter as well as the dissertation in whole seek answers to. 
 
2.2 NATURE OF THE KENYAN LABOUR MARKET 
Of Kenya’s population of over 43.2 million, 17.2 million compose the labour force; 
that is those that are working and those that are not but are actively looking for a job.61 
An astounding 82.7% of those working are in the informal sector, implying that only 
shy of 2 of every 10 labourers in Kenya are under formal employment.62  
 
                                                     
61DTUCIDC, Kenya Labour Market Profile 2015, at 7. 
62 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 2015, 2015, at 2. 
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Kenya’s unemployment rate was places at 9.2% of the labour force in 2013 and more 
appalling is the youth (persons of age 15-24 years) unemployment which was placed 
at around 38% of the youth population in the labour force.63 This is even though 
different sources have presented different figures as to the unemployment rate. 
According to the World Bank in 2016, the youth unemployment rate in Kenya 
currently lies at 17.4%.64 It could however also be that there has been a marked 
improvement between 2013 and 2016. All in all, the figures still point to a rather high 
unemployment rate and that a large majority of those unemployed are the youth. The 
annual job creation rate is similarly unimpressive relative to the increasing demand 
of jobs. It is estimated that around 350,000 jobs are created annually, both in the 
formal and informal sector, whereas 800,000 people enter the job market annually.65 
 
Similarly, the Kenya labour market has been experiencing a great deal of 
casualization, which is a lack of job security of labourers -either by a lack of 
permanence of tenure or weaker working conditions. The proportion of casual 
workers in the formal sector was established to be at 30%.66 The significance of 
Kenya’s unemployment rate to this study is that it brings out a dynamic of demand 
and supply of labour that affects minimum wage law enforcement in the labour 
market. As it may be observed in the section concerning the causes behind the 
enforcement or compliance rate, the oversupply of labourers in a struggle for few jobs 
diminishes the labourers’ bargaining power for better wages, ideally those at or above 
the minimum wage prescribed.  
 
Another point to note is that, in Kenya, small and medium sized enterprises provide 
employment for 74% of all workers.67 The significance of this is that workers in 
smaller firms are less likely to be assured of their working rights and conditions, 
including pay at or above the minimum wage, as opposed to their counterparts in 
larger firms or in government.68  With such a high percentage employed in medium 
                                                     
63 DTUCIDC, Kenya Labour Market Profile 2015, at 8. 
64 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?year_high_desc=true on 21 January 2017. 
65 DTUCIDC, Kenya Labour Market Profile 2015, at 7. 
66 Central Organization of Trade Unions – Kenya (COTU-K), Federation of Kenyan Employers 
(FKE), Government of Kenya (GOK) , ILO, Kenya Decent Work Country Programme, 2013-2016, at 
7. 
67 COTU-K, FKE, GOK, ILO, Kenya Decent Work Country Programme, 2013-2016, at 7. 
68 WageIndicator Foundation, Wages in Kenya, June 2012, at 13. 
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to small size enterprises therefore, the probability of compliance with minimum wage 
laws indeed diminishes. This fact importantly helps to identify the areas or enterprises 
that need to be identified as those influencing most the extent of enforcement of 
working conditions, including minimum wage law, as will be looked at in the relevant 
section handling the same.  
 
Further, in Kenya, only 11% of the labour force is unionized.69 Similarly, only a 
meagre 6.5% are covered under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).70 This is 
similarly significant as will be noted hereunder in the Chapter. Additionally, and 
equally important is the status of the Kenyan labour market as regards working hours. 
According to a survey, the normal average working hours in Kenya are 64 hours a 
week.71 This is far beyond the prescribed 52 hours of work a week as is lawfully 
provided for.72 This becomes relevant in that the variable of time worked relates to 
the wages payable. Extra hours worked ought to attract compensation in overtime.73 
Working hours hence relate to minimum wage laws, in that compliance or 
enforcement cannot be said to be achieved in instances where workers are marginally 
compensated at the minimum prescribed rate but consequently overworked for a 
stretch of additional hours weekly. 
  
Thus, in analysing the extent or degree of minimum wage enforcement in the relevant 
subsection, the dissertation will give due regard to the crucial variable of working 
hours. 
 
The above is a concise outlook of the Kenyan labour market as it mostly relates to 
minimum wage law enforcement in Kenya. As it will be observed in the succeeding 
sections and even chapters, most of these statistics will be relevant in analysing and 
explaining various phenomena as the dissertation takes progress.  
 
                                                     
69 DTUCIDC, Kenya Labour Market Profile 2015, at 1. 
70 DTUCIDC, Kenya Labour Market Profile 2015, at 1. 
71 WageIndicator Foundation, Wages in Kenya, June 2012, at 15. 
72 Section 5, Regulation of Wages (General) Order, Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007)  
73 Section 6, Regulation of Wages (General) Order, Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007)  
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2.3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
MINIMUM WAGE LAWS 
The majority of the laws dealing with the enforcement of minimum wage law are to 
do with the general mandate and powers of the labour inspectorate to carry out 
investigations at workplaces so as to identify and confirm the adherence to working 
standards and conditions by employers. The Labour Institutions Act of 2007 is the 
main domestic law that deals with the enforcement of minimum wage laws, as was 
observed in Chapter 1’s Background. The Labour Institutions Act mainly derives its 
relevant parts to do with labour inspection from ILO labour inspection treaties Kenya 
is a signatory to.  
 
The main ILO treaties are the Labour Inspection Convention 1947 and the Labour 
Inspection (Agriculture) Convention 1969.  They are concerned with the enforcement 
of working conditions, minimum wage laws included. Seeing as the provisions of the 
Labour Institutions Act relating to minimum wages and their enforcement are broadly 
covered in Chapter 1’s Background, the International treaties are looked at hereunder 
including the articles of the treaties that were adopted into the Labour Institutions 
Act.  
 
The Labour Inspection Convention of 1947 was ratified by Kenya in 1964 whereas 
the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention was ratified in 1979. The Labour 
Inspection Convention firstly provides that each member of the ILO for whom the 
treaty is in force shall maintain a system of labour inspection in industrial and 
commercial workplaces.74 Kenya indeed adopted this provision as is seen under Part 
V of the Labour Institutions Act. Article 3 of the Convention provides for the 
functions of the system of labour inspection which are, inter alia, to secure the 
enforcement of the legal provisions relating to conditions of work such as provisions 
relating to hour and wages amongst others.  
 
Article 5 of the Convention calls upon the competent authority as concerns labour, in 
Kenya’s case the Ministry, to promote effective cooperation between inspection 
services and other government services and public or private institutions engaged in 
                                                     
74 Article 1, Labour Inspection Convention, 11 July 1947, UNTS vol. 54, 1-792. 
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similar activities. It also calls for cooperation amongst inspectorate officials, 
employers and workers or their respective organisations. The Convention further 
provides that the inspectorate staff be public officials whose status and conditions of 
service are such that they are assured of stability of employment and are more 
importantly independent of external influences and changes in government.75 
 
Furthermore, the Convention mandates that the number of labour inspectors be 
sufficient so as to ensure the effective discharge of the duties of the inspectorate.76 
Equally significant, is the Convention’s requirement that the Ministry or competent 
authority in a member state ensure that the labour inspectorate is well equipped for 
the performance of their duties including with adequate transport facilities 
necessary.77  
 
Moreover, Article 12 of the Convention empowers labour inspectors to access 
workplaces without notice as well as enter any premises which there is reasonable 
cause to believe is liable for inspection. Additionally, the Article empowers labour 
inspectors to require the production of any books, registers or other documents the 
keeping of which is prescribed by national laws in order to establish whether or not 
there is conformity. In the context of minimum wages, the documents implied are the 
wage sheets as provided for in Section 35 of Kenya’s Labour Institutions Act. This 
section provides that a labour officer may, for the purpose of monitoring or enforcing 
compliance with any labour law, require the production of wage sheets kept by an 
employer and any other such records as is required by any labour law or wages order 
to be kept by employers, and may inspect and examine such sheets or records.78 
 
Article 16 of the Convention further reiterates that workplaces should be inspected as 
often and as thoroughly as is necessary to ensure the effective application of the 
relevant legal provisions. Another noteworthy provision of the Convention is its 
Article 27 that recognises arbitral awards and collective agreements upon which the 
                                                     
75 Article 6, Labour Inspection Convention. 
76 Article 10, Labour Inspection Convention. 
77 Article 11, Labour Inspection Convention. 
78 Section 35(1)(a), Labour Institutions Act (Act No. 12 of 2007) 
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force of law is conferred and thus are inclusively enforceable by the labour 
inspectorates. 
 
The Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention is more or less identical with the 
Labour Inspection Convention save for the different areas they deal with, one being 
agricultural and the other commercial. Additionally, the primary provisions of these 
conventions have equally been adopted into Part V of the Labour Institutions Act. 
The above is thus a look at the legal framework surrounding the enforcement of 
minimum wage laws in Kenya. Its incorporation in the dissertation is crucial as it will 
find relevance in the forthcoming subsections and Chapters.  
 
2.4 WHAT IS THE DEGREE OR EXTENT OF MINIMUM WAGE 
LEGISLATION’S ENFORCEMENT IN KENYA? 
The presence and clarity of minimum wage laws and other labour regulations is not 
a problem as much as their enforcement is in Kenya and other developing countries.79 
A departure or separation in this sense has indeed been identified by authors and 
scholars. Labour regulations are mostly in place though stronger enforcement is 
required.80 Even in the realm of policy and research, enforcement of labour 
regulations, minimum wage laws included, has been widely ignored and a focus 
instead on the viability and feasibility of minimum wage laws themselves in the 
various local jurisdiction preferred.81 
 
With that said, most of the studies commissioned over the years to investigate on the 
extent of the enforcement of minimum wages in Kenya have painted a grim picture 
of the same.  
 
Coverage 
Minimum wages cover the labourers identified in both the General Wages Order 
(GWO) and Agricultural Wages Order (AWO) as well as in the additional sector-
specific Sectoral Wages Orders (SWOs) that the Cabinet Secretary is empowered to 
                                                     
79 Bhorat H, ‘Compliance with minimum wage laws in developing countries’, 1-2. 
80 COTU-K, FKE, GOK, ILO, Kenya Decent Work Country Programme, 2013-2016, at 12. 




periodically enact. The Wages Orders are designed to determine and provide for 
minimum wages judging by the level of skill of a labourer where say, for example, 
drivers fall in a different category with house servants and the minimum wage for the 
former is set higher than that of the latter. Multiple categories characterise the Kenyan 
system so as to set more fitting and customized wages for the many kinds of labourers 
as opposed to generalizing all to one minimum wage thereby being ignorant of their 
variant skill levels.82 
 
The latest GWO and AWO are as available in the Kenya Law resource.83 As can be 
seen in both the General and Agricultural Orders, there are provisions for general 
labourers and unskilled employees, respectively, presumably to cover the labourers 
that may fail to fall under the specified occupational categories. Otherwise, the 
occupations in the GWO range from night watchmen to bakers and artisans, whereas 
under the AWO, they range from herdsmen, farm foremen and different classes of 
drivers.  
 
Method of measurement 
The method of measurement used to establish the rate of the enforcement of minimum 
wage laws is crucial,84 as different methods may end up relaying differing results. 
Most of the studies that have previously looked to establish the extend of 
enforcement, as will be seen hereunder, measure non-compliance or non-enforcement 
of minimum wage laws by calculating the total number of workers paid below the 
minimum wage in comparison to the total number of workers and thereafter 
presenting it as a percentage. As it may however be observed in the subsequent 
Chapters, the said method may be insufficient in that it fails to measure how serious 
or grave the degree of such non-enforcement is. This current measure, applied by 
most of the current studies on the subject, generalises those workers severely paid 
                                                     
82 Manda D, Kosimbei G and Wanjala B, ‘Impact of minimum wages on formal employment in 
Kenya’, 4. 




=AFQjCNHZcBX8xN-YHm3O0YP1-4E5tXqi2g&sig2=EGmw-anOmLIJXXigknTgDg on 11 
February 2017. 
84 Bhorat H, ‘Compliance with minimum wage laws in developing countries’, 2. 
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below the minimum wage and bundles them together with those just cents shy of a 
wage at the minimum level.85 
 
Extend or degree of enforcement 
Nonetheless, as has been mentioned, mostly all the studies on this subject point to a 
poor degree of the enforcement of minimum wage legislation. The latest study on the 
subject by DTUCIDC places the non-enforcement or non-compliance at 42% of all 
the Kenyan labourers.86 This implies that only 58% of all labourers are duly and 
legally remunerated at or above the minimum wage rates. The Report further indicates 
that non-enforcement largely affects workers in the informal sector. Eighty-five 
percent (85%) of workers in the formal sector are paid at or above the minimum wage 
compared to a negligible 35% of all workers in the informal sector.  This is indeed 
dumbfounding given the fact that the informal sector accounts for over 82% of 
Kenya’s labour force as was observed in the first section of this Chapter.  
 
The DTUCIDC Report relies on a 2012 survey to indicate that non-enforcement 
mostly affects the youth or those under 29 years of age, with only 47% of them being 
remunerated at or above the minimum wage compared to their counterparts 50 years 
or older, of whom 71% are paid at or above their respective minimum wages.87 Non-
enforcement is also more rampant for workers in smaller firms and for workers 
without working contracts in comparison to their counterparts with permanent 
contracts. The enforcement or compliance rate for workers with permanent contracts 
is at 78% whereas that of workers without contracts is at 40%.88 The survey also 
indicates that men are more likely affected by non-enforcement than women; 64% of 
women are paid at or above the minimum wage relative to 55% of the men.89 
 
In terms of variances according to occupations, the survey points out that labourers 
in the craft and related trades are least paid at or above the minimum wage as 
compared to managers at an astounding 11% versus 82% enforcement rate 
                                                     
85 Bhorat H, ‘Compliance with minimum wage laws in developing countries’, 2. 
86 DTUCIDC, Kenya Labour Market Profile 2015, at 6. 
87 WageIndicator Foundation, Wages in Kenya, at 11. 
88 WageIndicator Foundation, Wages in Kenya, at 11. 
89 WageIndicator Foundation, Wages in Kenya, at 11. 
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respectively.90 In terms of variances as to education, labourers with only primary 
education are mostly affected by non-enforcement as compared to their counterparts 
with more than upper secondary education at a similarly astounding huge differential 
of 36% versus 79% enforcement rate respectively.  
 
The above Report’s and survey’s credibility is indeed enhanced by the fact that it 
takes consideration of the hours of work when computing the compliance or 
enforcement rates with minimum wages. In fact, the survey calculates the wage rates 
hourly as opposed to say monthly or daily.91 This way, it eliminates the risk of 
assessing minimum wage law enforcement without giving regard to hours worked or 
overtime payable as had been mentioned in this Chapter’s first section.  
 
Andálon and Pagés relied on 1998/1999 IFLS Labour Force data for their analysis of 
minimum wage enforcement which is now rather outdated. Nonetheless, they still 
observed that minimum wage enforcement was poor. The finding indicated that 1 in 
4 workers under the AWO was paid below the minimum wage (24% non-
compliance/enforcement rate) and that 1 in 6 workers under the GWO were paid 
below the minimum wage (17% non-compliance/enforcement rate).92 
 
If it is anything to go by, a comparison of the DTUCIDC’s Report numbers (based on 
a 2012 survey) with those of Andálon and Pagés’ study, reliant on 1998/9 labour force 
data, show that minimum wage enforcement in Kenya has been at a downward spiral 
in recent years. At 1998/9, the proportion of labourers paid below the minimum wage 
was only at 17% and 24% under the GWO and AWO respectively whereas at 2012, 
the proportion grew to 42% of all the workers as accords the DTUCIDC Report. 
However still, this could be a potentially dangerous inference in that both studies were 
carried out differently – such as the consideration for the hours of work by the 2012 
study – and also that other factors, such as the regular increases in the amounts 
prescribed as minimum wages over the years, could have affected the enforcement 
rate between the two periods.   
 
                                                     
90 WageIndicator Foundation, Wages in Kenya, at 12. 
91 WageIndicator Foundation, Wages in Kenya, at 11. 
92 Andálon M and Pagés C, ‘Minimum wages in Kenya’, 4-9. 
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Nonetheless, both studies are comparable as regards non-enforcement affecting the 
youth and less educated more. Andálon and Pagés similarly find that it is mostly 
younger workers and the less educated that are more likely to be paid below the 
minimum wage.93 However, in regards to the gender variable, Andálon and Pagés 
differ with the 2012 survey; they point out that the rate of enforcement was the same 
for both women and men under the AWO but in fact lower for women, at 75% 
compared to 93% for men, under the GWO. Conversely, according to the 2012 
survey, women were better covered than men under both the GWO and AWO 
aggregated. Equally important to note is that non-enforcement affected higher skilled 
workers under the GWO more than their lower skilled counterparts therein according 
to Andálon and Pagés’ study.94 This could be because the prescribed wages for higher 
skilled workers are set higher than those of lower skilled workers under the Orders. 
 
The above are the main studies that have looked to empirically establish the degree 
of the enforcement of minimum wage laws in Kenya and they both point to a poor 
degree of enforcement. Others such as of Haroon Bhorat assert that minimum wage 
law enforcement and compliance in developing countries has always been poor and 
Kenya is no exception with an equally astounding non-compliance or non-
enforcement rate of 70% in higher skilled occupations in urban areas.95 
 
At this point, it is evident that the enforcement of minimum wage legislation is indeed 
poor in Kenya. The latest study by DTUCIDC, places it at 42% of all labourers in 
Kenya, whereas the older study by Andálon and Pagés indicate a somewhat lower but 
still significant non-enforcement rate. It has also been observed that non-enforcement 
is mostly rampant in the informal sector which comprises more than 82% of the 
Kenyan workforce. The method mostly applied to measure non-enforcement in the 
studies is taking the proportion of those paid below the minimum wage and 
contrasting it to the total number of labourers to present it as a percentage. All in all 
this section of the Chapter establishes that indeed the degree or extent of the 
enforcement of minimum wage legislation in Kenya is poor.  
 
                                                     
93 Andálon M and Pagés C, ‘Minimum wages in Kenya’, 9. 
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2.5 WHAT IS THE CAUSE OF THE POOR DEGREE OF MINIMUM 
WAGE LEGISLATION’S ENFORCEMENT IN KENYA? 
As has been established in the preceding section, the enforcement of minimum wage 
legislation in Kenya is dismal. This section consequently endeavours to look into the 
reasons or causes of the poor degree of enforcement of these laws. It will look to do 
this in four broad subsections that encompass the various causes or reasons. The 
subsections are Inspectorate capacity and other institutional factors; Setting; 
Informality; and lastly, Lack of awareness and civic education.  
2.5.1 Inspectorate Capacity and other Institutional factors 
As has been previously mentioned, the labour inspectorate under the Ministry is 
responsible for the enforcement of minimum wage legislation in Kenya. The 
inspectorate is supposed to do this by carrying out inspections at the workplaces and 
requesting wage sheets as well as interviewing employees should there be need for 
the same.96 However, in practice, many studies point to a lack of capacity on the part 
of the Ministry’s inspectorate as a major factor hampering the enforcement of 
minimum wage laws. The poor capacity of the labour inspectorate to enforce labour 
laws is attributable to an array of factors such as corruption, being under resourced 
and outnumbered relative to the demands of the labour market. 
 
The effectiveness of labour inspection is typically measured by comparing the 
number of inspectors with the numbers of the workforce in a certain jurisdiction; this 
is according to the ILO in 2006.97 Thus according to the ILO, the benchmark for an 
ideal inspectorate for developing countries like Kenya is one inspector for every 
40,000 workers. However, as the previously looked at KUDHEIHA study observes, 
Kenya’s numbers are indeed depressing. As at 2010, Kenya’s inspectorate of only 90 
staff had to serve a labour force of 10.958 million workers. That presented a ratio of 
1 inspector for every 121,752 workers. What is even more appalling is that the 
numbers have over the years kept looking worse. At 1996, the ratio was 1 inspector 
for every 37,284 workers; this was optimal applying ILO standards. The numbers 
have however consistently and gradually gone downhill from there on; not only in 
terms of the ratios but in the actual number of the inspectorate staff. Below is the table 
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from the KUDHEIHA report comparing the number of staff of the labour inspectorate 















1996 4.314 116 37,284 -2,716 
1997 4.707 114 41,214 1,214 
1998 5.100 112 45,506 5,506 
1999 5.493 114 48,181 8,181 
2000 5.912 115 51,755 11,755 
2001 6.367 116 55,257 15,257 
2002 6.852 116 59,197 19,197 
2003 7.330 115 63,702 23,702 
2004 7.999 117 68,363 28,363 
2005 8.505 112 75,938 35,938 
2006 8.993 107 84,050 44,050 
2007 9.479 104 91,143 51,143 
2008 9.946 93 106,948 66,948 
2009 10.439 96 108,735 68,735 
2010 10.958 90 121,752 81,752 
 
 
Evidently, from the above table, the demands of the labour force have overtaken the 
capacity of the government to ensure the steady enforcement of labour regulations, 
minimum wage laws included. It is manifest that the Kenyan government has over 
the years significantly failed to focus on endowing the inspectorate so as to protect 
workers’ rights in Kenya.  
 
More to that, other additional factors have contributed to the inspectorate’s sorry 
capacity. Ronconi and Almeida, in their work on the enforcement of labour laws in 
the developing world, Kenya included, observe some trends that severely limit the 
effectiveness of labour inspections. For example, they observe that in almost all the 
countries they surveyed, larger firms are more likely to be inspected than smaller 
firms.99 This is even though larger firms are more likely to comply with labour 
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regulations relative to smaller firms.100 Also, this becomes more noteworthy in that 
in Kenya, 74% of all employment is provided by small to medium sized enterprises 
as was observed in the first section of the Chapter. Ronconi and Almeida similarly 
observe that inspected firms, relative to those not inspected, are more likely located 
in the capital city and are more likely to have a large proportion of their workforce 
unionized. This is even though many of the sectors in Kenya are decentralised, as the 
KUDHEIHA study observes for domestic workers,101 and that only a meagre 11% of 
the Kenya work force are unionised.102 Ronconi and Almeida also observe that 
inspected firms, relative to the non-inspected, are more likely to have a more educated 
workforce. The higher probability for inspection attributable to unionisation and 
education is so since unionized and educated workers are more likely aware of their 
rights and thus are more likely to lodge complaints to the inspectorate for 
inspection.103 
 
What is observable from Ronconi and Almeida’s finding is that there is an observable 
disconnect between the objectives of the labour inspectorates and how they go about 
achieving them. The inspectorates, Kenya’s included, seems to be ignorant of the 
areas where violations are mostly likely to happen.104  
 
Corruption, bribery and a general lack of institutional goodwill has also been a factor 
incapacitating the Inspectorate and other key institutions relevant for minimum wage 
law enforcement. It has been pointed out that Kenyan trade unions are constantly 
concerned with the bribery of labour inspectors by employers in the country.105 The 
KUDHEIHA study also observes a general culture of impunity surrounding the 
enforcement of labour regulations from the players in the labour market, the 
inspectorate and employers included.106 The Ronconi and Almeida study indeed 
observe a correlation between a low rule of law perception in a certain State and the 
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inefficiency of labour inspection in the same State.107 Another concern is that the 
awards of Kenya’s Industrial Court, a court constitutionally established to adjudicate 
on labour issues and to protect labour rights, have been identified as not being 
consistently enforced in the country.108 
 
2.5.2 Setting 
Another crucial factor influencing the degree of the enforcement or compliance with 
minimum wage legislation is their setting. Setting in this case refers to how the 
minimum wages are set either in terms of amounts prescribed or occupations included 
therein (or excluded for that matter) in the wages orders. Setting in this subsection’s 
context similarly refers to other considerations such as of the sufficiency of existent 
SWCs relative to the labour market’s demands.  
 
Amount 
Authors such as Andálon and Pagés and Bhorat and Stanwix have attributed the poor 
degree of the enforcement or compliance with minimum wage law to a high setting 
of minimum wages in terms of amount.109 Such a high setting, evident especially for 
higher skilled occupations as seen in the current GWO and AWO, means that fewer 
employers are able to pay such employers at the prescribed rate without being 
economically constrained.  
 
Andálon and Pagés observe that the Kenyan minimum wages under the respective 
order are set relatively high compared to the prevailing median wages in Kenya.110 
They observe that the minimum wages set in the orders are way higher than the 
existent median wages of Kenyan workers thus they may be in fact be impractical or 
over-ambitious on the part of the setters. To better scrutinize how high the minimum 
wage is set relative to the average wage, Andálon and Pagés rely on the Kaitz ratio, 
a method of measurement used to compare the two – median wage and the prevailing 
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108 DTUCIDC, Kenya Labour Market Profile 2015, at 3. 
109 Bhorat H and Stanwix B, ‘Minimum wage enforcement in the developing world’, 5. 
110 Andálon and Pagés rely on the median wage as opposed to the mean wage as reliance on the mean 
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minimum wages. Grounded on the Kaitz ratio, they observe that Kenya’s minimum 
wage is 0.76 of the median wage under the GWO.111 They further indicate that this 
ratio is indeed high since Columbia’s ratio of 0.68 is considered to be high.112 As 
such, the high setting in amounts is observed as one of the causes of the low degree 
of compliance with these laws as employers are economically constrained to be 
accommodative of them. 
 
This is not helped by the high unemployment rate facing the country as has been 
pointed out in this Chapter’s first section. With such a depressing unemployment rate, 
employees lack bargaining power against the relatively few employers under the 
classical economic model.113 This means that many labourers find themselves willing, 
out of desperation, to be employed even when receiving measly wages below the 
prescribed minimum wage.114  
 
Occupations and Wages Councils 
Another factor as regards the setting of minimum wage is the occupations considered 
in the wages orders and also the sufficiency of the current SWCs as such. As regards 
the occupations, it has been noted that some of the existent occupations provided for 
in the current wages orders are outdated or non-existent in today’s labour market.115 
This invariably means that the wages orders have failed to consider some of the novel 
and contemporary occupations in Kenya. Indeed, this exclusion could however or 
similarly relate to the problem of informality that will be looked at hereinafter.  
 
Furthermore, the KUDHEIHA study observes that there lacks SWCs for nonetheless 
crucial sectors or industries that indeed deserve the specialized attention that comes 
with the SWCs. As was observed in Chapter 1, the Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry 
is empowered to establish sectoral councils for any sector that, in his opinion, is not 
sufficiently covered under the GWO and AWO. However this is in actuality not the 
                                                     
111 It is however 0.39 of the median wage under the AWO: Andálon M and Pagés C, ‘Minimum wages 
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case for domestic workers as the KUDHEIHA report points out.116 This becomes even 
more significant considering that the domestic workers industry accounted for a 
whopping 5.2% of waged employment in Kenya as at 2011.117 Of course, this point 
similarly relates to informality in Kenya’s labour market which will be looked at in 
the ensuing part.  
 
Correspondingly, and in a light that would seem contradictory of the above, the many 
categories of minimum wages in their variances in terms of location and occupation 
in Kenya have been attributed as a factor causing the poor enforcement of minimum 
wage law. This is because the many categories mean that it is harder for the employers 
to master the applicable minimum wage for their respective employee(s).118 Indeed, 
this is a concern that can instead or equally be attributed to a lack of awareness or 
civil education as will be looked at in a succeeding subsection of this section 
concerning the same.  
 
Sanctioning 
Additional to the legal duty of minimum wage setting are the sanctions or penalties 
that attach to minimum wage law non-compliance by employers. Under the Labour 
Institutions Act, the penalty resultant on an employer for a failure to comply with 
minimum wage legislation is reimbursement by the employer to the employee of the 
difference in wages that ought to have been paid to them as per the wages orders, and 
any other penalty that the court of law would render in addition.119 Bhorat and 
Stanwix indeed observe that higher penalties for non-compliance allow for better 
compliance with minimum wage law.120 
 
 It could therefore be, as a cause, that the poor degree of enforcement in Kenya is 
attributable to the non-existence of higher or, more so, more established and clear 
penalties under the law such as to be more effective in deterring employers from non-
compliance. However, the prospects of improved sanctions will be looked at in the 
ensuing Chapter concerned with avenues that can be put in place to improve 
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enforcement. Also noteworthy is that the effectiveness of sanctions goes hand in hand 
with and is dependent on an effective inspectorate keen on identifying violations, 
which is neither the case in Kenya as has been observed above. 
 
2.5.3 Informality 
Informality comprises an additional major factor that influences the enforcement of 
minimum wage legislation in Kenya. Informality in this context refers to the high 
proportion of informal labour that there is in Kenya. As has been mentioned before, 
a whopping 82.7% of employment in Kenya comes from the informal economy 
whereas only shy of 3 in 10 employees therein are remunerated at or above the 
minimum wage. In contrast, 9 in 10 employees are remunerated at or above the 
minimum wage in the formal sector. Informality can indeed thus be attributed as one 
of the major factors causing the poor enforcement or compliance with minimum wage 
laws in Kenya. Ronconi and Almeida indeed observe a correlation between 
inspections and the size of the informal economy, where countries with more labour 
inspections carried out have less informality, relative to countries with less 
inspections having more informality.121  
 
The question as regards informality is however complex and difficult to grab a hold 
of especially as regards establishing causal effect and causal linkage.122 It is also 
reckless to refer to informality as a mere problem whereas informality could as well 
be looked at as a means by which employers and entities in such an economy absorb 
the economic shocks and constrains in the said economy.123 In such cases, the lack of 
the option to exist as an informal entity for such employers would mean extinction 
and that would yield negative results to economic growth and the rate of employment 
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consequently.124 In this sense then, Informality can be looked at as advantageous or 
at least provisionally crucial.  
 
However still, in some aspects, avoidable but poor enforcement of minimum wage 
legislation is attributable, to informality. It is observed that firms elect to stay informal 
so as to avoid labour regulations that they view as excessive economically.125 As such, 
such firms make the rational economic decision even though still illegal.   
 
Nonetheless, the USAID observes that there are barriers that keep firms out from 
formalizing, thereby being less visible for inspection. These barriers range from and 
are caused by factors such as bureaucracy in business registration and licensing, and 
corruption in public administration.126 In such instances therefore, the blame for 
locking out firms in the informal economy can be wholly apportioned to the state that 
fails to ensure an effectual and corruption-free business environment.  
 
Additionally, and in another vein, Informality becomes a problem when rather novel 
and informal occupations are not included in the wages orders or granted designated 
SWCs for specialized attention.  Such affected employees in the informal economy 
are therefore left to be covered under the “general” or “unskilled” employee 
categories under either the GWO or AWO.127 As such, informality becomes a general 
problem when the right occupations cannot be identified to the labourers in the first 
place. Informality indeed surrounds the major issues that derail enforcement in 
Kenya. As will be looked at in the succeeding Chapter, the creation of an efficient 
and corruption free business environment by the State is crucial in helping firms 
transform into formalization and thus become more visible for inspections. 
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2.5.4 Lack of awareness and civic education 
Another key factor that has derailed the enforcement or compliance with minimum 
wage law in Kenya is a general lack of awareness and education on the part of the 
various relevant players in the labour market including mostly employers and 
employees. The minimum wage laws in Kenya are indeed relatively complex in that 
they include various variations variant on occupation and location. Similarly, 
minimum wages are updated at least annually or biennially, thus becoming subject to 
regular change. Sectoral wages are also periodically published and gazetted by the 
respective SWCs. Consequently, these categories indeed prove to be too many for 
employers to master and Bhorat and Stanwix indeed observe this as a factor inhibiting 
compliance and enforcement.128 
 
In a similar vein, the herein relied on KUDHEIHA study points to a low level of 
awareness on the part of the players in the labour market as regards minimum wage 
law and other conditions of labour.129 The KIPPRA Report equally points to a general 
lack of awareness on the part of the workers as regard their right to remuneration at 
or above the prescribed minimum wages.130 Even in instances where employers have 
been good willed and informed and in fact paid employees at the prescribed minimum 
wage requirements, complaints as regards subjecting workers to extended hours of 
work without due overtime payments have been reported especially in Kenya’s 
hospitality industry.131  
 
Unionization  
Furthermore, the Kenyan labour force presents low figures as regards unionization. 
Only 11% of Kenyan labourers are members of trade unions.132 Moreover, only 6.5% 
of Kenyan labourers are covered under a CBA.133 A positive correlation between 
unionization and better wages, at or above the minimum wage, has been established 
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by a multitude of studies. Ronconi and Almeida observe that labour inspection, in 
low and lower-middle income countries such as Kenya, is more likely to take place 
in firms with unionized workers as opposed to those without.134 They attribute this to 
the fact that in such countries, inspection agencies have lower technical capacity to 
detect violations and hence rely more on complaints which are more likely to be made 
by workers who are aware of their rights, such as unionised and more educated 
workers. Unionization is therefore key in ensuring or at least positively influencing 
the degree of enforcement of labour regulations and thus the fact that only 11% of the 
Kenyan workforce is unionized points to a general lack of collective struggle as one 
of the causes of the poor degree of compliance or enforcement with minimum wage 
laws.  
 
Authors such as Omolo observe that negotiated wages enumerated in CBAs arising 
from trade union membership are mostly if not always at an amount that is above the 
prescribed minimum wages for the respective employers.135 Omolo remarkably 
observes that the prescribed minimum wages at a given time act as benchmarks as to 
which the various parties in the negotiations of CBAs use to more or less guide the 
amounts in wages that are consequently agreed upon.136 He terms this as the ‘ripple 
effect’ of minimum wages, where prescribed minimum wages act as a guide to 
negotiated wages and thus consequently, it more likely results in higher agreed upon 
(negotiated) wages. Owidhi equally observes that negotiated wages tend to be set way 
higher than the prevailing prescribed minimum wages.137 The above reliance on both 
Omolo’s and Owidhi’s work is so as to bring out the significance unionization has on 
wages and yet the opportunity of unionization is one that a majority of Kenyan 
labourers seem not to be keen on relying on, thus contributing as a factor causing a 
general low compliance and enforcement rate of labour regulations let alone 
minimum wage laws.  
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Indeed, the low level of unionization could be attributed to a lack of awareness and 
civic education on the part of the workers and employers too,138 thus bringing this 
part to context. In the KUDHEIHA study, 89.3% of domestic workers indeed 
identified trade union membership as a prospective avenue through which they could 
improve their working conditions though such workers would consequently be 
illegally constrained by their employers from proceeding to join such trade unions.139 
This is despite the fact that every worker is constitutionally empowered and protected 
to freely associate for the purpose of championing for his or her rights.140 
 
Thus, the general lack of awareness in the labour market amongst the different players 
becomes a major hindrance for the compliance with and enforcement of minimum 
wage legislation among other conditions of labour. A general lack of complete 
knowledge as to the respective legal rights and obligations arising for both employers 
and employees is indeed a major factor causing the sorry state of enforcement and 
compliance.  
 
Accordingly, what is looked at above are some of the major factors that are behind 
the poor extent of the enforcement of minimum wage legislation in Kenya. They 
range from Institutional factors; the legal setting of minimum wages; the informal 
nature of the majority of Kenya’s labour force; and a general lack of awareness 
amongst some of the key players in the labour market. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter thereby concludes having analysed the questions it sort to. It indeed 
establishes a poor extent of the enforcement of minimum wage legislation and 
comprehensively looks at some of the key factors causing the said poor degree of 
enforcement. Consequently, what is looked at in the succeeding Chapter 3 are some 
of the avenues that may be applicable for the purpose of improving the now 
established poor degree of enforcement.  
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APPROACHES THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED SO AS TO 
IMPROVE THE ENFORCEMENT OF MINIMUM WAGE 
LEGISLATION IN KENYA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As has been observed in Chapter 2, the extent of  the enforcement of minimum wage 
laws is indeed poor and the causes to that regard have been looked at as well. Chapter 
3 therefore follows up and seeks to look at some of the avenues and approaches that 
can be applied in Kenya so as to remedy the sorry state of these laws’ compliance and 
enforcement rate. As will be seen, most of these avenues looked at hereunder mostly 
stem from the causes looked at in Chapter 2 and seek, as such, to be remedial of the 
said causes. The avenues are broadly broken down into 6 categories being setting; 
labour inspection; “soft” mechanisms, awareness and unionisation; sanctioning; 
formalization; and other additional measures addressed in different sections.  
 
3.2 SETTING 
As discussed in Chapter 2, ‘setting’ refers to how minimum wages are fixed, and all 
the legal considerations therein including the provisions to do with the amount; 
categorizations and variations regarding occupations and location; and furthermore, 
provisions relating to the enforcement. As such, and as was similarly mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the legal process of setting the minimum wages is crucial and is a factor 
that could contribute to a poor compliance or enforcement rate. Indeed, it is noted that 
when looking to scrutinize the enforcement rate of minimum wage laws and means 
by which such enforcement can be improved, it is important to first consider how they 
are set in the relevant enabling laws.141 
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As was observed in Chapter 2, Kenya’s minimum wages are indeed numerous due to 
their variations in occupations and locations.142 So as to better enhance enforcement, 
it is argued that a less complex minimum wage system is preferable.143 This is more 
so for governments that are constrained of resources, such as is the case for Kenya144, 
in that they hardly can enforce and follow up on the different categories and variations 
of minimum wages.145 As such, Kenyan policy makers and legislators should consider 
simplifying or altering the provisions to make them less complex. This way, 
minimum wage rates will be better known by inspectors, employers and employees, 
thus enhancing compliance and enforcement.146 In a similar vein, less complex 
minimum wages are advantageous in that they are easier to communicate and 
sensitize to the different labour market players when public campaign and awareness 
efforts are made by the state or other non-state actors. 
 
Of course, this presents a contradictory situation seeing that multiple categories and 
variations of minimum wage are enacted for the reason that they represent better the 
diversity of the labour market and are thus more realistic and aligned for every worker 
they look to cover.147 In this regard therefore, the legislators and policy makers ought 
to weigh all these considerations and balance them out. Indeed, they can maintain the 
categories but ensure their efforts, in terms of ensuring their communication and 
sensitization to the public and the interested parties, are enhanced and improved, as 
will be observed in the succeeding section concerning awareness raising.  
 
Amount 
Similarly, in Chapter 2, it was observed that the high setting of the minimum wage 
amounts relative to the prevailing median wages is a factor inhibiting the compliance 
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and enforcement rate of minimum wage laws. As such, the relevant policy makers 
and legislators ought to weigh in the circumstances at hand. Indeed, as is observed in 
Chapter 1, economic circumstance and such other considerations are supposed to 
guide the wage councils in their setting of the minimum wage amounts. Therefore, 
the relevant policy makers ought to balance out the setting, taking such economic 
factors into consideration.  
 
Hence, should the relevant drafters feel that the prevailing rates are indeed suitable 
and not high, such that they give due regard to the economic situation of employers, 
then they should indeed stick to such rates but still look to enhance their top - down 
enforcement approach through better labour inspection and the other measures that 
are discussed in this Chapter. This is the same for the multiple categories of minimum 
wages; should the concerned drafters be of the opinion that they nonetheless need to 
maintain the current system.  
 
All in all, setting as has been noted, is a crucial step that policy makers looking at the 
enforcement of minimum wage and how such enforcement can be enhanced cannot 
afford to ignore.148 Setting, as such, should be first considered before delving into 
other measures of improving enforcement and compliance. 
 
3.3 LABOUR INSPECTION 
Inspection is the standard measure by which labour laws, including minimum wages, 
are enforced. According to the ILO’s data base, Over 100 countries globally use 
inspectorates to enforce labour laws,149 and Kenya is no exception. That 
notwithstanding, and as was observed in the preceding Chapter, Kenya’s inspectorate 
and inspection system is disappointing and that need not be reiterated. Numerous 
remedies as regards the same therefore need to be considered. Firstly, the State ought 
to sufficiently fund the labour inspectorate so as additional staff can be employed and 
so that their training can be carried out. It is with sufficient funding that the 
inspectorate can be enhanced so that it can cease being under resourced and 
                                                     
148 ILO, ‘Chapter 6 - How to enforce minimum wages’ in Minimum wage policy guide, 2. 
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understaffed.150 An enhanced higher ratio of inspectors to workers will indeed result 
to higher enforcement and compliance rates over time in Kenya.151  
 
More importantly, efficiency in carrying out inspections has to be considered as an 
avenue through which the enforcement of these laws can be enhanced. This is 
especially so for under-resourced inspectorates and those with limited funding like 
Kenya’s. Such efficiency by the inspectorate can be achieved through different ways 
looked at hereunder. 
 
Prioritization and target inspection 
Prioritization entails the discriminate inspection of sectors, areas, or workers that are 
perceived or known to be more likely affected by non-compliance, so as the 
inspectorate can invest their limited resources, manpower and time to nonetheless still 
significantly influence the compliance and enforcement rate.152 This approach is 
indeed fitting for Kenya given its inspectorate’s limited capacity. As such, Kenya’s 
inspectorate could look to concentrate more in the informal economy, for example, 
seeing that as was noted in the preceding Chapter, it is the one mostly affected by 
non-compliance and non-enforcement of minimum wage legislation.  
 
Complaints systems 
Furthermore, so as to boost it efficiency, the labour inspectorate could look to adopt 
an effective, accessible and confidential system of airing complaints. For an 
inspectorate with limited resources, an effective system of complaints could be really 
advantageous, where labourers who are victims of non-compliance can signal to the 
inspectorate for the purpose of the inspectorate’s response in inspection.153 As such, 
Kenya’s inspectorate should look to adopt such a system. The system should be 
accessible, such as through toll-free telephoning hotlines, and should be 
accommodative of various languages and not simply the official languages so as to 
be equally of reach to the illiterate or less educated working population.154 More 
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importantly, the system should be safe such as to ensure the confidentiality of the 
complaining labourers in order to protect them from employer retaliation;155 a subject 
that will be looked at hereunder in the Chapter as well. 
 
Partnerships 
Another significant approach that could enhance the labour inspectorate is through its 
partnership with other actors, whether governmental or non-governmental. Trade 
Unions, Public Interest Groups (PIGs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
and other actors should be entitled under law to attend labour inspection as Benassi 
observes.156 This way, the inspectorate is held to a higher degree of account. 
Furthermore, the inspectorate should look to partner with other State institutions that 
could help in identifying non-compliance and capturing such non-complaint 
employers as well.157  The Kenyan inspectorate could for example coordinate with 
the Department of Small, Medium and Micro enterprises (SMMEs) of the Ministry 
to facilitate sustainable and tailored enforcement in the informal economy.158 This 
multi-stakeholder and multi-institutional approach is indeed recognised under the 
Labour Inspection Convention looked at in Chapter 2 and could thus indeed enhance 
inspections thereby positively influencing the enforcement rate.159 
 
Additionally, the inspectorate should be rid of corruption and instances of bribery 
which was observed in the preceding Chapter as a factor contributing to its poor 
functioning. This can be achieved through better remuneration of the inspectorate 
staff as well as additional reward based bonuses such as to make them generally less 
prone to compromise.160 Also, a rotational policy could be introduced where an 
inspector’s mandate in a certain sub-region is limited in time after which, he is 
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transferred to another region to avoid his familiarization with the area’s employers 
which may lead to the creation of corruption links.161  
 
Undeniably, labour inspection is crucial in the enforcement of minimum wage laws 
such that without its enhancement, other applicable approaches do not 
correspondingly succeed.162 As such, the above measures can be applied by Kenya’s 
labour inspectorate for it to be adequately enhanced.  
 
3.4 “SOFT” MECHANISMS, AWARENESS, AND UNIONISATION. 
Soft mechanisms are other additionally important approaches, different from the 
standard top-down mechanisms the State applies - for example labour inspection, to 
facilitate compliance.163 Soft mechanisms thus differ from “hard” mechanisms which 
are the standard model States rely on. Soft mechanisms are as a matter of fact hugely 
fundamental in ensuring effective enforcement of labour regulations including 
minimum wage laws.164 The hard, top-down mechanisms are by themselves not 
precisely sufficient to ensure the proper compliance with and enforcement of 
minimum wage laws. Applicable soft mechanism are numerous and they range from 
persuasion; public campaigns; capacity building and training of employers and 
employees, among others that are looked at hereunder.  
 
These mechanisms, as will be noted too, require the significant and creative 




Persuasion is one of the soft mechanisms that can influence enforcement and 
compliance greatly. Persuasion has been described as creating a “culture of 
compliance”.165 This is done through different means such as trained inspectors 
engaging employers and managers in open and frank discussion regarding non-
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compliance so as to establish the cause of such non-compliance together with ways 
in which compliance can be gradually achieved.166 Bhorat identifies this patient and 
engaging means of ensuring compliance as the “Latin model of enforcement” that 
similarly looks to progressively get employers or firms to comply with minimum 
wage laws, by applying persuasive techniques and allowing for a period of time to 
enable such employers to transition to full compliance amidst economic constrains.167 
This method is advantageous in that it looks to sustainably get the laws complied with 
by engaging the employers and furthermore educating them on the purpose and need 
to comply. It is additionally suitable in that it can be applied in the informal economy 
as opposed to the top-down approach of enforcement that risks to drive firms in the 
informal economy to extinction as will be subsequently touched on in the 
formalization section  of the Chapter.  
 
Training and capacity building, and information dissemination 
Training and capacity building in relation to employers and employees is another 
form of soft mechanism that can enhance compliance and enforcement. This entails 
the inspectorate, and/or any other State or non-State agents – such as unions, 
instructing and making known to both employers and employees about minimum 
wage laws, the ways in which they are complied with and the respective right and 
obligations arising from the employment relationship.168 This way, it is ensured that 
non-compliance is not due to a lack of awareness, knowledge or understanding on the 
part of the labourers and firms as was unfortunately observed as the case for Kenya 
in Chapter 2. 
 
Such training will be additionally beneficial, in that workers will be more likely to 
raise complaints when they have knowledge of their rights.169 
 
More importantly, a legal provision to mandate employers to display the relevant 
wages orders at the workplace or at the place where wages are to be paid to the 
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employees could indeed be significantly helpful in ensuring that employees are in full 
knowledge of the wages due to them.170 Such a measure has indeed proved beneficial 
in countries such as Algeria.171 Indeed, Kenya’s way of communicating and 
publishing wages orders through gazette notices is not by itself sufficient and 
accessible to many employees and even employers.172 
 
Public campaigns 
Another related soft mechanism that can be applied is the use of public campaigns so 
as to sensitise the various labour market players about these laws. The information to 
be disseminated may be to do with the laws’ general importance and even the 
prevailing rates as accords the wages orders.173 This is indeed one of the most 
appropriate measure to ensure compliance with minimum wage laws.174 Public 
campaigns can take the form of radio, television or newspaper advertisements and 
posters where persuasive messages are presented, as well as information to do with 
the prevailing minimum wage rates and any changes thereof.175 This measure 
increases awareness of these laws thus enhancing compliance.176 
 
Another related and equally effective means is the public naming and shaming of non-
compliant employees. This measure acts as a deterrent for firms since the negative 
publicity that comes with such a proclamation of violating labour laws leads to 
immeasurable market losses for such violating firms.177 In Kenya, the state or other 
non-state players could look to rely on this measure to encourage compliance with 
minimum wage laws.  
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This dissertation recognises unionisation as a fitting measure that can greatly 
influence the enforcement of minimum wage legislation. In Chapter 2, the significant 
influence unionisation has on wages, owing to collective bargaining and wage 
negotiation, was pointed out. Similarly, unionisation has the effect of enlightening 
labourers about the labour rights due to them and hence they are able to demand the 
enforcement of such rights even through complaining to the inspectorate.178  
 
Nevertheless, unions in Kenya could do with the support of legal guarantees and 
assurances; they should be empowered under law to, for example, attend inspections 
so as to hold the inspectorate accountable as was earlier mentioned regarding 
partnership in labour inspection. Furthermore, and more importantly, they should be 
granted the legal right and guarantee to access workers in their workplaces so as to 
recruit and educate them of their rights.179 
 
Conversely, unions ought to work on the internal problems facing them so as to be 
fully effective in championing workers’ rights. These include bureaucracy and 
capacity problems that face Kenyan unions.180 
 
 All in all, more and more workers should look to get unionised so as to be able to 
access the benefits that come with unionisation; the 11% unionisation rate in Kenya, 
as was noted in Chapter 2, is dismal.  
 
3.5 SANCTIONING 
It is only with an effective deterrent measure that employers can be discouraged from 
non-compliance with minimum wage legislation.181 Firms should never elect not to 
pay at the prescribed minimum wages following economic calculations that make 
non-compliance cheaper than compliance.182 As such, the sanctions that an employer 
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is likely to face on non-compliance need to be indeed punitive. Kenya’s legal 
framework as concerns sanctioning is however unfortunately vague and not as 
retributive. Section 48 of the Labour Institutions Act provides that the court seized of 
such a matter concerning minimum wage violation may order the remuneration of the 
accrued difference in wages plus any other penalty the court may consider.183 The 
problem with Kenya’s framework is that it lack clarity and grants the court the 
discretion to be possibly lenient. 
 
It is observed that, in many developing countries, the threat of imprisonment is one 
of the only effective deterrent measures for employers who fail to remunerate as per 
the wages orders.184 Such imprisonment could be considered for Kenya as well. 
Alternatively, a clear, fixed and certainly punitive fine provision could do. It is 
observed that in Colombia for instance, the fine due to a non-compliant employer 
may possibly reach the respective minimum wage provision violated multiplied to up 
to 100.185 A provision that is equally cognisant of, and more retributory to repeat 
offenders is also key for the sanctioning and deterrence mechanism so as to enhance 
compliance. In some countries, the penalty for repeat violators could involve 
suspension or complete cessation of one’s business.186 Such measure may indeed be 
considered for Kenya. 
 
More importantly, the means through which, and time in which such sanctions are 
meted to the employers and wages recovered by employees is really key for 
establishing an effective enforcement mechanism.187 Regrettably in Kenya, sanctions 
can only be handed by the courts and so is the recovery of wages by employees.188  
This thus results not only in a discouragingly long process for the workers seeking 
redress, but is also less punitive for employers if compared to an instantaneous 
sanction.189 In some countries such as South Africa and Thailand, labour inspectors 
are indeed empowered to order the payment of the wages due on inspection.190 This 
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model is certainly advantageous in that it fastens the recovery of wages and workers 
are additionally not subjected to the complex, lengthy, and uncertain processes of the 
court.191   
 
Such efficient provisions could thus be considered for incorporation into Kenya’s 
legal framework. Certainly, the accompanying labour inspectorate has to be indeed 
equally well capacitated, trained and - more importantly, not corrupt, seeing as such 
a measure grants them increased discretion.192 
 
3.6 FORMALIZATION 
The complexity of the informal economy and the complexity of its identification as a 
problem, as such, was pointed out in Chapter 2. Being in the informal economy means 
less visibility for inspection193; and with an over 82% stake in employment, the 
informal economy present a huge problem that requires rectification in Kenya. Steady 
and sustainable formalization of Kenya’s informal economy needs to be achieved so 
as to protect the workers therein from the unsuitable working conditions that 
characterise it, minimum wage law non-compliance included as was noted in Chapter 
2.  
 
Firstly, seeing that informality and formalization as such lacks a definite definition, 
formalization in this section’s context refers to the deliberate submission for visibility 
by informal firms to the state through their registration and their gradual compliance 
with labour laws and other requisite but relevant legal requirements.194 Informal firms 
can indeed progress to formalization but, as Nyambari observes, patience in handling 
them is ever critical since rushing would drive them out of the economy as a result of 
financial and capacity-related constrains.195 
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For that reason, the role and duty that falls on the Kenyan government is to ensure 
that an exceedingly conducive environment is created for such firms so as to enable 
their formalization without economic hardship that would do more harm than good. 
Hence, the State can do this by firstly ensuring that public administration, including 
licensing and registration is streamlined and made exceedingly efficient and 
inexpensive.196 Furthermore, the State should work to alleviate corruption in public 
administration that proves costly for informal firms - for instance through bribe 
remittance. Additionally, corruption lowers the informal players’ confidence in the 
State agencies thereby leading to such firms electing to stay in the informal 
economy.197 All these issues indeed affect Kenya and its informal economy and 
thereby ought to be corrected.198 
 
Service delivery, such as of provision of infrastructure and micro-financing, to the 
informal firms by the State is also key. This is so as to legitimize the State’s role and 
significance such that informal firms can appreciate the reason and purpose of 
formalization and indeed be incentivized to formalize.199 One of the reasons that 
informal firms in developing countries elect to stay informal is that they do not 
anticipate the prospects of reaping governmental support and services from such 
formalization anyway.200 
 
Another mechanism that can be used to accommodate the informal economy and 
boost the enforcement of minimum wage laws therein is the application of the 
previously mentioned soft mechanisms, as well as the aforementioned “Latin 
enforcement model” that looks to have the laws incorporated into firms progressively 
and may in fact allow time for firms to comply. The application of this model is as 
opposed to applying the standard and less engaging retributive model of enforcement 
that is likely to unsustainably constrain such informal firms economically.  
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With the above applied remedies, informal firms are more likely to respond positively 
by gradually complying with minimum wage laws whether voluntarily or through 
their increased visibility for labour inspection.201 
 
In addition, the wages councils and the Ministry ought to take cognisance of the novel 
jobs that are not specially recognised under any of the wages orders. As was discussed 
in Chapter 2, the exclusion of these new types and kinds of occupations mostly found 
in the informal sector has not been reflected in the published and gazetted wages 
orders.  
 
3.7 ADDITIONAL MEASURES 
Other supplementary and helpful measures that can be applied to guarantee the 
enforcement of minimum wage legislation are such as barring non-compliant firms 
from credit and procurement contracts, as well as protecting labourers from employer 
retaliation.  
 
3.7.1 Barring from credit and procurement contracts. 
Benassi identifies debarment from procurement contracts as an innovative measure 
through which compliance of firms with minimum wage laws can be achieved. Under 
this measure, legislation could provide that no governmental procurement or 
tendering opportunities are to be advanced to non-compliant firms.202 Indeed, Article 
227 of the Constitution of Kenya provides for this and paves a way for such provisions 
to be properly established and enforced. The Article concerns governmental tendering 
for good and services, and provides that legislation be brought to effect to provide for 
the sanctioning against persons under the Article guilty of, inter alia, violations of 
employment laws and practices. 203 Indeed, this Article was actualised by the 
enactment of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, which in its section 41 
provides that a person shall be debarred from participating in procurement 
proceedings if such a person is, inter alia, guilty of a serious violation of fair 
employment laws and practices.204  
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Therefore, The Ministry (of Labour) could proactively look to coordinate with these 
state agencies responsible for the regulation of procurement contracts, such as the 
Public Procurement Regulatory Board (PPRB), to effectively identify and debar 
minimum wage law violating firms from procurement opportunities. This way, firms 
will be keen to comply with minimum wage laws seeing that they risk missing out on 
such lucrative opportunities.  
 
Similarly, it could be provided under law that no credit or loan facilities are to be 
advanced to any non-compliant firm by any financial institution. This again forces 
firms to comply with minimum wage laws lest they are blocked from accessing 
capital advancements. Such a measure could indeed be applicable in Kenya and 
would constitute suitable incentives to ensure compliance. For this to be effected, a 
blacklisting system for the purpose should be established and the proper mechanism 
for keying in and omitting firms effected.205 
 
3.7.2 Protecting labourers from employer retaliation. 
Another crucial consideration that ought to be incorporated into Kenya’s enforcement 
mechanism is the protection from vulnerability for employees upon their looking to 
advocate or demand for their rights whether individually or collectively. The 
KUDHEIHA points to the curtailing of employees by employers when such 
employees look to join unions.206 Furthermore, the report identifies the power 
imbalance in the employment relationship, where employers have immeasurable 
market power in contrast to the surplus low skilled workers, as a reason why 
protection from such retaliation is needed.207 As such, legal guarantees or provision 
should be put in place to penalize any employer or firm that looks to negatively affect 
ones employment status in any way for the reason of their taking action to advocate 
or demand for the observance or enforcement of their rights.208 
 
                                                     
205 Benassi C, ‘The implementation of minimum wage: Challenges and creative solutions’, 31. 
206 KUDHEIHA Workers, A rapid assessment of domestic workers in Kenya, at 12-13. 
207 KUDHEIHA Workers, A rapid assessment of domestic workers in Kenya, at 12. 




In conclusion, the various approached that can be adopted so as to enhance the 
compliance with and enforcement of minimum wage law are looked at above. They 
range from cautiousness in the actual setting of minimum wages; enhanced 
inspection; additional “soft” mechanism, awareness raising, and unionisation; and 
formalisation amongst others such as debarment from procurement contracts and 
from the advancement of credit facilities.  What is correspondingly evident is that 
these measure are, in different ways, related and complementary of each other. Such 
an enforcement model of incorporating and combining different approached is indeed 
also acclaimed for its optimal outcomes.209 Furthermore, and in a general sense, it is 
apparent that what the enforcement of these laws and the proper application of these 
mechanism requires is the attention and goodwill on the part of the State towards the 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 Summary and Conclusion 
At the onset, this dissertation purposed to assess the enforcement of minimum wage 
legislation in Kenya. Bit by bit, such assessment was done looking at the extent of 
enforcement, the reasons behind such an extent of enforcement, and consequently, 
avenues that could be relied on so as to improve said enforcement.  
 
In Chapter 2, both the extent of enforcement and the causes behind such an extent of 
enforcement were looked at. It was established that Kenya’s minimum wage 
enforcement is indeed poor with the latest work on the same placing the non-
enforcement rate at 42% of all labourers. Subsequently, after establishing the 
enforcement rate as indeed dismal, the dissertation went ahead to establish the causes 
of such a poor extent of enforcement.  
 
There were indeed numerous causes identified as being behind the poor rate of 
enforcement, and they varied from a poorly capacitated labour inspectorate that is 
under-resourced, under-staffed and inadequately funded, to a high incidence of 
informality in Kenya’s labour market seeing that firms in the informal economy are 
less visible for inspection thus a low compliance rate.211 Similarly, the setting of 
minimum wage was observed as a factor herein, in that Kenya’s minimum wage 
system comprises numerous provisions variant on occupation and location that are 
hence hard for employer and employees alike to master. Under setting, it was 
additionally observed that Kenya’s minimum wages are set too high in relation to the 
prevailing median wages, and as a result, they become too much of an economic 
constrain for firms to internalize.  
 
Another cause for the established poor enforcement of minimum wage laws was 
identified as a general lack of awareness and civic education of the various relevant 
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labour market players such that their limited knowledge of these laws, their 
applicability and the resultant and related rights and obligations created by them 
prevented such players from fully appreciating and applying the said laws.  
 
Consequently, Chapter 3 looked to analyse approaches that could improve the 
enforcement of these laws in Kenya and it indeed identified the enhancement of 
Kenya’s inspectorate capacity as well as its application of certain efficient methods, 
such as targeted inspection, so as to further impact the enforcement rate. Sustainable 
formalization of the informal economy was similarly outlined as a measure that could 
enhance the compliance with and the enforcement of these laws by making firms 
more visible for inspection. 
 
 Other additional measures that were analysed in Chapter 3 were the application of 
soft mechanism; such as awareness raising and civic education through public 
campaigns and training of the labour market players about the applicability of 
minimum wage laws. Additionally, unionisation of the un-unionised working 
population was noted as a key approach that could positively influence the 
compliance and enforcement rate due to the supportive role that unions play in 
advocating for their members’ rights as well as educating them on the same. 
Similarly, fostering partnerships between unions, the inspectorate and other relevant 
agencies in addition to enhancing the internal working of Kenyan unions was 
sensitized on.  
 
A review of Kenya’s legal provisions concerning the sanctioning of minimum wage 
law violators was similarly looked at in Chapter 3. It was observed that they needed 
to be enhanced, and such enhancing provisions indeed need to be made more punitive 
to employers by being clear and prescribing a fixed form of penalty whether in the 
form of high fines or an imprisonment sentence. More aggravated sanctions for repeat 
violators was similarly identified as a measure that could improve the sanctioning 




All in all, this dissertation achieved what it purposed to attain by consolidating and 
conceptualizing different strands of literature to comprehensively present the status 
of the enforcement of minimum wage laws in contemporary Kenya.  
 
4.2 Recommendations  
The recommendations that consequently stem from the writing of this dissertation are 
as follows. Firstly, it is this dissertation’s recommendation that the State ought to first 
consider its priorities in terms of policy direction concerning the labour market. This 
is because, as was pointed out, there is a high unemployment rate in Kenya, and the 
annual job creation is furthermore not satisfactory enough to contain the steady 
demand for employment. Similarly, the productivity of Kenya’s labour market has 
remained low, such that its contribution to the Gross domestic product (GDP) is 
insignificant and has indeed remained stagnated.212  
 
As such, the government ought to first consider whether it should really focus its 
attention and resources to the vigorous enforcement of minimum wage laws and other 
conditions of labour, whereas many other Kenyans do not have such employment in 
the first place. Therefore, this dissertation suggests that the government could first 
ponder on whether it should direct its resources and attention into job creation213 as 
opposed to directing such resources into the enforcement of minimum wages law in 
the first place. Furthermore, in addition to freed up resources for employment 
creation, a failure by the state to enforce these laws for the time being  may more 
likely result in the creation of employment to ease the currently poor unemployment 
rate.214 
 
As such, this dissertation indeed recognises the importance of the enforcement of 
minimum wage laws, but it still maintains that this should not be done blindly without 
consideration of other labour market factors.  
                                                     
212 Omolo J, Akoten J and Oyugi L, ‘Viability of increasing minimum wages in 2009 in Kenya’ DP 
No. 110 of 2009 Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (2009), 33-36. 
213 For employment creation as a State’s role, see Dundon T and Rollinson D, Understanding 
Employment Relations, McGraw-Hill Education, 2011, 170. 
214 Though contentious, there exists compelling evidence establishing a positive correlation between 
increased enforcement of minimum wage laws and an increased unemployment rate in developing 
countries, Kenya included. See Manda D, Kosimbei G and Wanjala B, ‘Impact of minimum wages on 




Secondly, this dissertation identifies the need for a better method of measurement of 
non-enforcement and non-compliance. As was noted, the current method of 
measurement, that simply looks at the percentage of employees remunerated below 
the minimum wage relative to those rightly remunerated, is abstract. One standard 
measure, which similarly looks at the gravity of the established non-enforcement rate,  
needs to be established for policy and academic circles and so as to rightly determine 
the extent of enforcement and compliance with minimum wage law.215  
 
Lastly, this dissertation recognises the fact that the area of minimum wage 
enforcement has been widely ignored by the academic community even when the 
viability of minimum wages by themselves has received abundant policy attention.216 
Therefore, this area of research needs to be further dwelled on as it is not currently 
well traversed. More importantly, primary research regarding the enforcement of 
these laws in Kenya ought to be carried out. There is not sufficient and up to date 











                                                     
215 Bhorat H, ‘Compliance with minimum wage laws in developing countries’, 8. 
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